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CIVIL PROCEDURE: OTHER DISCIPLINES,
GLOBALIZATION, AND SIMPLE GIFTS
Gene R. Shreve*
AMERICAN CIL PROCEDURE: AN INTRODUCTION. By Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr. and Michele Taruffo. New Haven: Yale University Press.
1993. Pp. x, 230. $28.50.
The unassuming tone and diminutive size of this book belie its
worth. Authors Geoffrey Hazard1 and Michele TarUffo 2 have pro-
duced a remarkable exegesis of their subject. As an introduction for
academics without law training, this book is without equal. It will
help American proceduralists wishing to acquire a comparative or
global perspective. Beyond all that, it is simply a seamless, lucid, and
thoroughly enjoyable work.
Far more is known in this country of the first author than of the
second. Coauthor of a major civil procedure treatise3 and author of
many influential civil procedure articles, 4 Hazard stands with Charles
Alan Wright5 at the top of the field. Taruffo's English-language publi-
cations have not been extensive; he is a scholar primarily of Italian
law. 6 The publications that have appeared could suggest an interest
less focused on civil procedure than Hazard's.7 Taruffo's interest in
* Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington. A.B. 1965, University of Oklahoma;
LL.B. 1968, LL.M. 1975, Harvard. - Ed. The author thanks colleagues Alfred Aman and
Lauren Robel for their research suggestions.
1. Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University.
2. Professor of Law, University of Pavia, Milan.
3. FLEMING JAMES, JR., ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 1992).
4. They are too numerous to list. A few of my favorites are Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discov-
ery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 2237 (1989); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965
Sup. CT. REV. 241; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Myron Moskovitz, An Historical and Critical
Anfallysis of Interpleader, 52 CAL. L. REV. 706 (1964).
5. Wright's publications are also too numerous to list. They include the leading multivolume
series CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE (1969-1993) (some
volumes coedited with Professor Arthur Miller and others) and Wright's distinguished single-
volume treatise, CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS (4th ed. 1983).
6. See, ag., Massimo La Torre et al., Statutory Interpretation in Italy, in INTERPRETING
STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 213 (D. Neil MaeCormick & Robert S. Summers eds.,
1991) [hereinafter INTERPRETING STATUTES].
7. This is not to suggest that Hazard's work has been confined to civil procedure. See, eg.,
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBIL-
Try AND REGULATION (3d ed. 1994).
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law appears to be that of a comparativist 8 and seems wide ranging.9
Readers may assume, then, that Hazard is largely responsible for
the richness of the book's discussion of American procedure and for
the surefooted progress the book makes through that entire subject.
Taruffo's greatest contributions may have come in the selection and
explanation of foreign law procedural models and in the successful
process of melding that material with descriptions of American proce-
dural law. His role may well be greater in a counterpart of this book
to appear in Europe.10 In the end, speculations concerning the relative
contributions of the coauthors are, of course, just that. Hazard and
Tarufo merely state: "The underlying analysis reflects several years
of discussion and many written exchanges between us" (p. x).
Most civil cases filed in the United States never see trial.11 When
trials do occur, they are not always efficient or reliable means for set-
tling controversies.1 2 For better or worse, however, trial is the center-
piece of American civil procedure, and it contributes more than any
other event to the shape of the subject.13 It therefore makes sense for
Hazard and Taruffo to make use of civil trial - or the prospect of civil
trial - to link together much of their work.14 About half the book
consists of successive chapters describing American procedure for pre-
paring for - or preventing - trial, basic and specialized forms of
8. Taruffo is described as a "comparativist" in D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S, Summers,
Preface and Acknowledgements, in INTERPRETING STATUTES, supra note 6, at xi, xii.
9. See, e.g., Robert S. Summers & Michele Taruffo, Interpretation and Comparative Analysis,
in INTERPRETING STATUTES, supra note 6, at 461.
10. "A different version of this book, designed for a European audience, is being published in
Italian." P. x.
11. "Usually they are settled, voluntarily withdrawn, or decided on the merits prior to trial."
GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE § 87 (2d
ed. 1994).
12. For example, commentaries on the reliability and efficiency of juries in civil litigation are
less than reassuring. See, eg., PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL (1984); JEROME FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL (1949); VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY (1986);
Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation Process - The Case for
the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 15 (1990); Ronald C. Wolf, Trial by Jury: A Sociological
Analysis, 1966 WIS. L. REv. 820.
13.
[M]any cases do require trial. As a more basic matter, the idea and prospect of trial strongly
influence the shape of procedure for all civil cases. Pleadings and pretrial proceedings set
bounds of inquiry for trial: discovery and less formal means of investigation prepare the
parties for trial: and trial can be either a specter which facilitates or an enticement which
blocks settlement.
SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 11, § 87.
14. At the same time, the authors do not exaggerate the importance of their subject. They
write:
Although civil litigation is highly visible in the American political scene, resort to litiga-
tion is in fact exceptional. In most situations where the injured party has a legally provable
claim, the loss is covered by the victim's own insurance (for example, medical insurance) or
simply absorbed as a misfortune. Litigation ordinarily is pursued only in cases of serious
injury resulting from conduct whose legal wrongfulness is at least reasonably arguable.
P. 208.
Simple Gifts
procedure for the trial itself, and the particular procedure involved in
appeal and judgment enforcement (pp. 105-204).
The other half of the book - most of it at the beginning - con-
sists of material enabling readers to view American civil procedure in
broader contexts. The book surveys the antecedents of American pro-
cedure found in our own history and abroad (pp. 1-28). It discusses
how American courts function as coordinate units of government,
with particular attention to public law disputes (pp. 29-34). The au-
thors review sources of governing law - constitutional, statutory, and
common law - and the relation between federal and state law (pp. 34-
43). They describe the structures of federal and state court systems
and explain the important influence of American courts, especially the
U.S. Supreme Court, on the shape of American law (pp. 43-70). The
authors end the book by reflecting on a variety of matters, including
procedural goals and justifications, financial constraints on court ac-
cess, and future reforms that might reduce the cost and improve the
quality of litigation (pp. 205-15).
This summary may suggest that American Civil Procedure is rather
orthodox. In fact, the opposite is true. The book does not really con-
form to any established model in the civil procedure literature. It at-
tempts no radical critique or reconceptualization of its subject. The
book does not confine itself to any particular aspect of the field. It
lacks the length, detail, and how-to orientation of a basic reference
work. It is also far too reflective to serve as an exam-preparation de-
vice for law students. What are the contributions of this book, then,
and how important are they?
The balance of this review addresses those questions. I suggest
that at least three groups of readers should be pleased by the appear-
ance of this book. In the first group are scholars who are not law
trained but who have a budding interdisciplinary interest in law. In
the second are law-trained readers with a substantial but insular un-
derstanding of American procedural law, who wish to enrich that un-
derstanding with comparative perspectives or who realize that even an
American law practice may now require some global understanding of
civil procedure. I inhabit the third group. It consists of hardened
proceduralists who delight in viewing their subject through the work
of a great master.
I. INTERDISCIPLINARY ATTRIBUTES
Perhaps the most significant development in modem legal scholar-
ship has been the increase in interdisciplinary inquiry. 15 Civil proce-
dure writing has benefited enormously from this movement. 16
15. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, LAW, INTELLECT, AND EDUCATION 56-57 (1979); Gene R.
Shreve, Eighteen Feet of Clay: Thoughts on Phantom Rule 4(m), 67 IND. L.J. 85, 90 (1991).
16. Work at the intersection of civil procedure and the social sciences provides an important
May 1994"1 1403
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However, effective use of the research methodologies and knowledge
of another academic discipline require of law faculty a "remarkable
task of self-education."' 17 When they have proper respect for disci-
plines not their own, law faculty embarking on interdisciplinary work
share a frightening realization. Unless they immerse themselves in the
new discipline and really come to understand it, they risk disseminat-
ing naivet6 or misinformation - in other words, bad scholarship.
Whatever else individual law faculty do to prepare for interdiscipli-
nary work, 18 all must read a great deal. All search in the beginning for
an authoritative introduction to the field that will get them across the
threshold of the new discipline. It may be a work written for academic
lawyers moving toward a particular discipline, 19 or it may inform a
broader audience.20 Such writings have one thing in common: they
give relative strangers to an area a kind of jumpstart - enough en-
lightenment to plan research agendas and to begin to become informed
consumers of scholarship within the new field. Only a special work
may be entirely successful in performing such a role. It must be com-
prehensive but not debilitating in length or detail. It must engage
readers who are highly intelligent and educated, yet uninformed in the
new area.
Reverse this process and it is possible to understand the great in-
terdisciplinary contribution of Hazard and Taruffo. Academics from
other fields wishing to include legal subjects as part of their interdisci-
plinary work will search for their own special books - informed,
comprehensive materials on law compatible with their needs. While I
cannot experience their reaction to American Civil Procedure, I imag-
ine that this is such a book.21
Professor Austin Sarat thinks so, and his capacity to empathize
with academics who have interdisciplinary designs on law is greater
than mine.22 He states that the book "does a wonderful job of explain-
example. See, eg., HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY
LITIGATION (1990); JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHO-
LOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know
and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L.
REv. 72 (1983).
17. ALLEN, supra note 15, at 56.
18. Some beginning interdisciplinarians may be able to enroll in courses, attend conferences,
or obtain the collaboration or informal assistance of one grounded in the new discipline.
19. See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, INTERVENTION AND DETACHMENT: ESSAYS IN LEGAL
HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE (1994). This book can serve as an informed and sensitive guide
for those wishing to move from traditional legal scholarship to legal history.
20. See, e.g., ALBERT BORGMANN, CROSSING THE POSTMODERN DIVIDE (1992). This con-
cise and illuminating discussion of modernism and postmodernism could be an invaluable start-
ing point for a project combining law and critical theory.
21. For another book of similar value to scholars untrained in law - one outside the field of
procedure - see J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY (1992),
22. While Sarat is now thoroughly versed in the law, he became interested in law as a soci-
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ing clearly and directly both the institutional bases and legal meaning
of our procedural system."2 3 He adds that "[i]t will be the best single
resource for a lay audience seeking a broad comprehension of the civil
justice system . "..."24
II. CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMPARATIVE LAW AND
GLOBALIZATION
Hazard and Taruffo note at the outset their intention to "contrast
American civil procedure with the civil law system of procedure that
is employed in Europe, Latin America, and Japan" (p. x). The au-
thors make comparisons with civil law in specific parts of the world.2 5
They also note features that set American civil procedure apart from
all foreign law.2 6 At this level, however, the book is a little disap-
pointing. Its treatment of foreign procedural law is unstructured and
episodic. Over significant stretches of the book, references to foreign
law all but disappear. The book therefore lacks the impact on either
comparative law or the newer globalization movement one might have
expected of these authors.
Comparative law and globalization both describe the transforma-
tion of a single-system inquiry into one contemplating the law of two
or more systems. The terms differ, however. The focus of the older
concept of comparative law tends to be either on the use of compari-
sons to enhance understanding of a particular legal system - usually
one's own - or on the search through different legal systems for uni-
versal principles of law.27 Hazard and Taruffo take aim at the first of
these goals28 and achieve a measure of success. They would have been
more successful, however, had they made more than scattered use of
comparisons.
ologist. He has become a distinguished interdisciplinary scholar. See, e.g., Austin Sarat, Enact-
ments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77
CORNELL L. REv. 1447 (1992); Austin Sarat, Off to Meet the Wizard Beyond Validity and
Reliability in the Search for a Post-Empiricist Sociology of Law, 15 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 155
(1990); Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiher, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in
the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663 (1989); Ralph Cavanaugh & Austin Sarat, Think-
ing About Courts: Toward and Beyond a Jurisprudence of Judicial Competence, 14 LAw & Socy.
REv. 371 (1980); Austin Sarat, Alternatives in Dispute Processing: Litigation in a Small Claims
Court, 10 LAW & Socy. REv. 339 (1976).
23. Austin Sarat, quoted on the back cover of American Civil Procedure.
24. Id.
25. For example, the authors explain how differences between the European conception of
law as a command of the state and the American conception of law as a shared political under-
standing affect how judges decide cases. Pp. 73-74.
26. For example, they write: "The most conspicuous characteristic of American civil proce-
dure is the jury system. No other legal system employs juries as the norm in civil cases .... P.
128.
27. MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADrrIONS 3-4 (1982).
28. They write, "Contrast, we hope, avoids both idealizing the American system and deni-
grating it by comparison with an unreal system of perfect justice." P. x.
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A newer term, 29 "'[g]lobalization' means different things in differ-
ent contexts."'30 One working definition for the term is the manner in
which political, economic, and technological developments have made
it increasingly difficult to contain legal practice within the borders or
system of a single nation. The notion that a lawyer practicing locally
may occasionally need to understand foreign law appeared as one jus-
tification for comparative law study.31 In contrast, the rhetoric of
globalization forces reexamination of our very concept of "local"
cases. 32 Applying the principle to civil procedure would suggest that
the interaction of domestic and foreign procedural law will affect an
increasing proportion of cases. 33 Hazard and Taruffo do not ignore
the trend of globalization,34 but they do not devote much attention to
the subject.
To be fair, it might have been difficult for the authors to go a great
deal further in developing the comparative law and globalization di-
mension without sacrificing the strengths of the book touted in this
review.35 Moreover, while the authors' contributions on the interna-
tional side are a bit thin, the book unquestionably conveys some useful
information about other procedural systems and broadens the reader's
horizon.
III. SIMPLE GIFrs
The Shaker religious sect flourished in this country in the late
29. Globalization "in academic circles... was not recognized as a significant concept, in
spite of diffuse and intermittent usage prior to that, until the early, or even middle, 1980s."
ROLAND ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION: SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE 8 (1992).
30. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies." An Introduction, 1 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (1993).
31. GLENDON ET AL., supra note 27, at 3.
32. Aman, supra note 30, at 1-3; Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Earth as Eggshell Victim: A
Global Perspective on Domestic Regulation, 102 YALE L.J. 2107, 2114 (1993).
33. This is already evident concerning service of process abroad. See EUGENE F. SCOLES &
PETER HRAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 12.7 (2d ed. 1992); Robert M. Hamilton, Comment, An
Interpretation of the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Docu-
ments Concerning Personal Service in Japan, 6 Loy. L.A. INTL. & COMP. L.J. 143 (1983);
Pamela R. Parmalee, Note, International Service of Process. A Guide to Serving Process Abroad
Under the Hague Convention, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 287 (1986). It is also evident concerning the
enforcement ofjudgments. See Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in
the United States: In Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 253 (1991); Peter Hay, The Recognition and Enforcement of American Money-Judgments
in Germany - The 1992 Decision of the German Supreme Court, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 729 (1992);
Robert E. Lutz, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Part Ir 4 Selected Bibliography on United
States Enforcement of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 27 INTL. LAW. 471 (1993).
34. For example, the authors review discovery in international litigation. Pp. 126-27.
35. A solid comparative law project - even one involving American law and that of only
one other nation - might require a much larger book. See, eg., P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (1987). A comprehensive at-
tempt to survey settings for procedural globalization might require the same. See, eg., GARY B.
BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS:
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS (1989).
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eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.36 Shakers are best
remembered for the distinctive and well-crafted buildings and furnish-
ings they left behind. According to a well-known Shaker hymn, "Tis
the gift to be simple."' 37 Shaker design is spare and outwardly simple,
but it reflects a sublime understanding of form and purpose. It is high
praise, then, to report that American Civil Procedure is quite
Shakerish.
Like the Shakers, Hazard and Taruffo obviously have the courage
of their convictions. It takes courage to write a serious book on civil
procedure that - while a boon to interdisciplinarians 38 - is not itself
interdisciplinary,39 that dares to use description as its primary mode,4°
and that believes a consensus about what civil procedure is or ought to
be is still possible.41
The authors are also courageous because they have selected an ap-
proach for writing about their subject that leaves them quite out in the
open. Those of us who have written hornbooks have been tempted in
moments of difficulty to take the easy way out, making strategic use of
the maxim: "[W]hat the legal system cannot answer it organizes." 42
Faced with difficulties in synthesis or in the search for animating prin-
ciples, authors of books conveying information in detail can use the
process of organizing that detail as a dodge. On the other hand, the
project Hazard and Taruffo undertake is all synthesis and animating
principles. There may be points here or there in the book with which
one could argue 43 Overall, however, the authors got it wonderfully
36. LINDA BUTLER & JUNE SPRIGG, INNER LIGHT: THE SHAKER LEGACY (1985); JUNE
SPRIGG, SHAKER DESIGN (1986).
37. MARTIN E. MARTY, PILGRIMS IN THEIR OWN LAND 191 (1984).
38. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
39. While it is difficult to overstate the positive contributions of interdisciplinary legal schol-
arship, the movement has produced a regrettable byproduct - the tendency of some to attack all
legal scholarship that is not interdisciplinary. Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an
Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARv. L. REv. 761, 766 (1987) ("The supports for the
faith in law's autonomy as a discipline have been kicked away in the last quarter century."); cf
Christopher D. Stone, From a Language Perspective, 90 YALE L.J. 1149, 1156 (1981) ("Asking
'what is law?' has fallen, I fear, out of fashion.").
40. The prevailing mode for serious legal scholarship in this country is normative rather than
descriptive. In contrast, there is still a healthy descriptive tradition in England. For an excellent
example, see P.P. CRAIG, PUBLIC LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA-(1990).
41. Some of us have expressed doubts on that score. See, eg., Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over
Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795
(1991); Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN.
L. REv. (forthcoming July 1994); Shreve, supra note 15; Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm,
Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Re-
form, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 659 (1993); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of
Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393 (1992).
42. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT S. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEO-
PLE 7 (1977).
43. For example, the book states: "The proliferation of complex litigation has resulted in
repeated calls for reform, but proposals to reduce or simplify complex litigation have typically
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The best statement I have encountered in legal literature of the
aesthetic and intellectual standard this book meets was made by the
late Professor Arthur Leff. In 1981, Yale Law School held a sympo-
sium on the function of legal scholarship. In a postscript, Leff
observed:
I do not want to end this symposium on a note of pure Yellow-Book
aestheticism, but I defy any of the symposiasts (and at least many of the
readers) to deny that they're also in the game (as, I suspect, were Adam
Smith and Karl Marx) for those occasional moments when they say, in
some concise and illuminating way, something that appears to be true.
Oh, I concede that people who write about law also have other rea-
sons for doing what they're doing: getting promoted, illustrating the
economic rationality of the common law... illuminating the necessary
incoherence of the infrastructure of the late monopoly-capitalist state so
as to hasten its eventual destruction. Whatever. But isn't it also true
that what we all also want is the rush that occasionally comes from do-
ing something very well which is very hard to do at all?
... [T]o have crafted, on occasion, something true and truly put -
whatever the devil else legal scholarship is, is from, or is for, it's the joy
of that too.44
The simple gifts in American Civil Procedure are great gifts indeed.
been superficial." P. 156. Most of the work on the major reform proposal in this area, THE
AMERICAN LAW INsrrruTE's COMPLEX LIrATION PROJECT (1993), must have occurred by
the time the authors completed American Civil Procedure. The approach of the ALI proposal is
not superficial. If anything, it suffers from a tendency to overreact to the problems of complex
litigation. See generally Gene R. Shreve, Reform Aspirations of the Complex Litigation Project,
54 LA. L. REv. 1139 (1994). On the Complex Litigation Project generally, see Symposium on the
American Law Institute Complex Litigation Project, 54 LA. L. REv. 833 (1994).
44. Arthur A. Leff, Afterword, 90 YALE L.J. 1296, 1296 (1981).
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